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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to examine
the information requirements for the pricing of joint products
arising in fixed proportions, and second, to identify the
accounting procedures that will meet those requirements . The
analysis is based on a deterministic model of the short-run
price-output decision for two complementary joint products
produced in fixed proportions. Consequently, the results of
the analysis do not extend to cases of variable proportions
or to other cases in which such a model is invalid. Moreover,
the analysis focuses on the price-output decision and does
not extend to problems of inventory valuation or income
determination.
When cost is joint in relation to two outputs produced
in fixed proportions, economists argue that any allocation
of such cost between the products must be arbitrary unless
determined by reference to demand functions. In other words,

2an allocation lacks economic justification unless it reflects
marginal revenues under the optimal price policy. Moreover,
since the demand-based allocation of the joint cost derives
from the optimal price policy, it cannot be used in reaching
the optimal price policy. One might be tempted to conclude
that accountants serve no economic purpose by assigning any
joint cost to products produced in fixed proportions. Such
a conclusion may be warranted when profit is maximized by
selling the entire output after separate processing; in. this
case, the demand-based allocation must be derived from the
optimal price policy and, hence, cannot be uned in reaching
that policy. But when profit maximization requires the sale
or disposition of some production at split-off, then the
demand-based allocation assigns the entire joint cost to the
other product, all of which is separately processed. In this
case the decision process may benefit by an accounting policy
that resists assigning any joint cost to such production.
More specifically, v/hen demand information is incomplete such
that split-off sales are known to be necessary but the optimal
prices are unknov/n, then such an accounting policy may be
useful in guiding experimentation with price-output possibilities
in an effort to maximize profit. In this way, the economic
analysis provides a limited justification for the by-product
method of accounting for joint production.
When a joint product is marketed partly at split-off, the
marginal cost of the separately processed portion is required

3in order to determine its optimal price and sales level.
Consequently, an accounting policy that makes that marginal
cost available will facilitate profit maximization with
respect to such production. Although economists and account-
ants have recognized that the marginal cost of separately
processed joint production (part of which is sold at split-
off) is required in order to determine its profit maximizing
price and sales level, the form of the required marginal cost
has not been clearly specified for all cases of interest.
The analysis below demonstrates that the appropriate form of
the required marginal cost depends on the assumptions made
concerning separate processing and disposition at split-off.
Formulation of the Maximization Problem
If two products are produced under fixed proportions in
quantities x-, and Xp, then the ratio of the outputs must be
constant for all levels of production, that is, x., = ^' xo»
If the production process is subject to an upper limit on
capacity, K, then two constraints are required to represent
the relations of production. Let us suppose that x., may not
exceed (a. *K) and that Xp may not exceed (ap«K) where a-, and
ap give the production of the two products per unit of
capacity. The upper limits on production of the two joint
pproducts may be written as follows:
xl
= al * K
U)
*2 = a2 ' E

In a typical cost accounting problem, we consider batch pro-
duction in this way, K units of material are introduced to
begin processing the batch and ^ach unit of material input
yields a, units of the first product and a2 units of the second.
A distinction is made between (i) production of a joint
product that is sold (or scrapped) at the split-off point
and (ii) production of a joint product that is sold after
further processing. If y1 and y2 represent separately
processed joint production and u-, and Up represent production
sold (or scrapped) at the split-off point, then the capacity
constraints may be written as follows?
*1 + Ul
= al
K
(2)
y2 + u2 = a2K
Provided that capacity^ K, can be readily adjusted 9 only one
of the two products will be sold at the split-off point; this
result will be demonstrated below. A diagrammatic represent-
ation of these relationships and definitions is given in Figure 1.
Unprocessed joint production is assumed to be sold in a perfectly
competitive market at a constant unit contribution, s,
,
given
by the difference between a constant unit selling price and a
3
constant unit selling cost. The total contribution from sales
of unprocessed production is given by:
(5) s^ + s 2u2
where s-, and s 2 are the constant unit contributions and u«
and u
2 are
the quantities of unprocessed joint production.

(b-K)
(B1 .U1 )
(s 2 -u2 )
^ y*
yx + U]L
= Xl = a
x
K
y? + u2 = x2 = a^K
2
u,
FIGURE 1.
—Joint Production Problem

On the other hand, separately processed production is
assumed to be sold in an imperfectly competitive market in
which the quantity sold is inversely related to the unit
price. Since the objective of this analysis is to determine
a profit-maximizing price policy, revenue from the separately
processed joint production is written as a function of price
5
as follows:
(4) pl' Dl^ pl^ + p2 t:D2^ p2^
where p. is the price of the separately processed ith product
and D. (p.) is its demand function* In order to simplify the
notation, the demand function will hereafter be written D.
.
The cost function recognizes two kinds of unit cost:
(i) unit costs of processing the separate products beyond
the split-off point, c-, and Cp? and (ii) a unit cost of
batch capacity, b. Since revenue is given as a function of
price, cost is also given as the following function of price:
(5) c^ % + c2 D2 ^ ^ K
The first two terms are interpreted as the cost of processing
the two products beyond the split-off point. The final term,
bK, gives the cost which varies with the size of the batch,
the capacity cost exemplified here by the cost of the jointly
7processed material input.

By combining the revenue and cost functions
given by
equations (3), (4), and (5) and the joint production
constraints
given by equations (2), a general programming
problem may be
formulated as follows:
MAXIMIZE ^ = D + p D _ eA - o^ + s^ a 2»2 - *K
vPl»P2» 1* 2' '
SUBJECT TO:
^l + ul
= alK
$2 + u2 ~ a2K
p-p P2 »
uit u2 , K >
The problem is to obtain the prices (?1 and p 2 ),
the quantities
of unprocessed joint production (^ and ug ) , and the batch
size (K), that maximize profit on a production
process issuing
two joint products in fixed proportions where each product
may
be processed beyond the split-off point.
Production subject to
separate processing is sold in an imperfectly
competitive market.8
Production subject to disposition at the split-off point is sold
in a perfectly competitive market to yield a unit
contribution
of s. dollars for the ith product.
In order to derive necessary conditions for a
solution to the
maximization problem above, we write the Lagrangian form as
follows:
(6) L = Tf - ^1 (B1 + ux
- a
x
K) - ^02 + *2 - a2K)
where Lisa function of plf p 2 , i^, u2 , and K. The dual

variables, $-, and ?L* may ^e interpreted as the marginal
opportunity costs of the two products. Moreover, the dual
variables imply an assignment of joint cost between the
products as will be shown below.
The necessary conditions^ for a solution to the maximization
problem are as follows t
( 7 ) pj d£ + DJ ~ c± dj - ix d* 4
(8) pj ( P* d* + DJ - cx dj - ^ dj) -
( 9) Pf >,
(10) p| d* + D* - c 2 dg - ^ d* ^
(11) p2 ^2 dl * D2 ~ ^2 d2 "" ^2 d2^ ~
(12) P| > o
(15) sl "" **1 ^ °
(14) uj ( s1 - ^) =
(15) u* ^
(16) S « *~ ©o c*» KJ
(17)
.
u£ ( s2 - jzJp) -
(18) u* >
(19) ~ b + al ^1 * a2 ^2 ^ °
(20) K* ( - b + a, *$., + a? jO =
(21) K* \

8Variables in the conditions above carrying a superscript
asterisk (*) are optimal values, that is, the prices, disposal
quantities and capacity that maximize profit* The symbol d. is
interpreted as the derivative of demand with respect to price,
that is 9
d. =s dDi / dp.,
and d* is that derivative evaluated at the optimal price, pf.
Optimal Price
Our primary purpose is to obtain a characterization of
the optimal prices in terms of cost and demand parameters to
enable recommendations for the assignment of costs. To this
end, let us assume that price is strictly greater than zero;
then conditions ( 8) and (11 ) yield the following expression
for the optimal price:
(22) pf = -D* / d* + c± + iv i - 1,2.
This equation says that the optimal price must be the sura
of the separate processing cost, c., and the marginal
opportunity cost of the ith product, 0., plus the term (-D|/d|)
which derives from the demand function. Since D* is positive
and d* is negative, the term (-D*/df ) is positive, In other
words, the optimal price is the sum of a positive demand
component and the marginal cost (c. + t/) m

9.
If we denote the price elasticity of the ith product by
N. where N. is defined as -d.p./B. (which is greater than
1 1 J. 1 -L
zero provided d
s
is negative) and if we let Nf he the elasticity
evaluated at the optimal price, then equation {22} can be
rewritten as follows:
Inspection of equation (23) shows (i) that (c, + ^. ) is
positive if and only if price elasticity, NJ, is strictly
greater than unity; (ii) that (c
i
+ i*) is zero if and only
if price elasticity equals unity; and (iii) that (c. + £/)
is negative if and only if price elasticity is strictly less
than unity. This relationship between price elasticity and
marginal cost Is used to characterize the optimal output policy
later in the paper*
In addition, marginal cost must equal marginal revenue
at the optimal price. Prom the theory of demand, we know that
price (p), marginal revenue (MR), and price elasticity (N) are
related by the equation:
(24) (N - 1) p = N (MR)
v/here p is any price and demand is differentiable and has an
inverse. Since optiraality requires that both (23) and (24)
be satisfied, the optimal price, p|, occurs at the equality
of marginal revenue and marginal cost, that is, MR = (cj + £*)•
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As noted above, the marginal opportunity costs, £* and
^p, imply an allocation of joint cost. This may be demonstrated
by reference to equation (20). If batch capacity, K, is greater
than zero, then condition (20) requires that the marginal Capacity
cost, b, equal the sum of the marginal opportunity costs weighted
by the input-output coefficients, a., and aOJ that is,
(25) b ~ al ^1 + a2 ^2
This means that the unit capacity cost, b s must be completely
allocated between the two joint products. In other words, $>.
may be interpreted as the share of b assigned to the ith product
under the optimal pricing policy.
Further discussion of the implied allocation is facilitated
by a distinction between two characterizations of the optimal
solution which we shall call Case I and Case II. In Case I,
the optimal price-output policy requires disposition or sale
of production both at the split-off point and after separate
11processing. In Case I±, the optimal policy requires that the
entire production of both products be marketed after separate
12processing.
In general the marginal opportunity costs are found by
solving the maximization problem. If Case II characterizes
the optimal solution, then the marginal opportunity costs will
be given in terms of both cost and demand parameters. But if
Case I characterizes the solution, then the marginal opportunity
costs are given in terms of cost parameters alone. In particular,

11
the entire joint process cost is assigned to the product
whose whole production is separately processed, Weil argues
that the marginal opportunity costs lead to a proper and use-
ful allocation of joint processing cost." it how can they "be
useful in reaching the optimal price-output policy if they
emerge simultaneously with it? Only if we know that Case I
obtains but do not know the optimal prices will the marginal
opportunity costs be useful in reaching the optimum* But,
as Weil points out, the marginal opportunity costs may assist
14in reaching other decisions.
Optimal Prices Under Case _I
Pricing a Join t ?r o duct Marketed Bo th Be i cre and Aft er
Seoarr-t e Processings If some of the first product is sold
at the split-off point, a characterization of its marginal
opportunity cost, £ , may be obtained from equation (14).
j.
If uj > 0, then jzL = s,, In words, when some of the
first product is sola at sp >ff , the marginal opportunity
cost is equal to the marginal contribution of sales at the
split-off point. This means that expansion of the separately
processed quantity reduces the quantity sold at the split-off
point and thereby sacrifices contribution at a rate of s^ dollars
per unit.

12
Substituting s
n
for ^-. in equation (22) yields the
-L J.
following expression for the optimal price of the separately
processed production:
(26) uf > implies that - -Dj/d^ + c 1 + s,
that is, the price of separately processed production must
provide for the recovery of "both the unit cost of separate
processing and the unit contribution foregone on sales at the
split-off point.
The optimal price may be interpreted in terms of equation
(23) to yield the relationship between the marginal cost (c-, + s,)
and the demand elasticity at which the separately processed
production should be marketed* If the marginal cost is positive,
then the separately processed nroduction should be marketed at
demand elasticity greater than unity. If, on the other hand,
the unit contribution on sales at the split-off point is
negative and sufficiently large in absolute value to make the
marginal cost negative, then the separately processed production
should be marketed at demand elasticity less than unity. In
this case, the marginal cost is the cost of separately processing
an additional unit less the disposition cost (plus the negative
contribution) avoided by doing so. In the special case that
the marginal cost equals zero, the separately processed production
is marketed at the point of unitary demand elasticity*
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These conclusions differ from those reached on the MS model,
but they are not inconsistent with them, Manes and Smith conclude
that "disposal of units of a product cannot yield maximum profit
unless the product is marketed at the point of unitary demand
elasticity, i.e., where marginal revenue = (or where marginal
revenue = marginal cost of processing and selling this item
alone) # "l^ The conclusion that sales of separately processed
production should be expanded until marginal cost equals marginal
revenue is correct. But marginal cost does not always equal
zero and equality does not always occur at unitary demand elasticity.
Consequently, revenue from separately processed production may be
falling, rising or stable at the optimal price.
^
In summary, when some production of a joint product is
sold at the split-off point, the price of production sold
after separate processing is given by the sum of (i) a positive
demand component (-Bf/dj), (ii) the unit cost of separate pro-
cessing (c i ), and (iii) the unit contribution of sales at the
split-off point (s.). The separately processed production may
be marketed at demand elasticity greater than, equal to, or
less than unity depending on whether (c- + s.) is positive,
zero, or negative.
Pricing a Joint Product Marketed Only After .Separate
Processing , We turn now to the price of the second product,
the entire production of which is sold after separate processing.
Prom equation (25) v/e know that the unit capacity cost, b, must
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equal the sum of a^ and a 2^2 , where a.± is the number of units
of the ith product produced by one unit of batch capacity and
where f*. is the marginal opportunity cost of the ith product.
Recall that if u* is positive, then ^ = s^ . Substituting this
equality in equation ( 25 ) yields:
(27) i2 * d/a2 )^ b " aisi )
This means that the marginal capacity cost of the second
product equals the entire marginal capacity cost minus the
marginal contribution on unprocessed production of the first
product with respect to production of the second, This
finding may be interpreted in terms of the price of the
second product by substituting equation (2?) in equation
(22) a s follows:
(28) Pj = - D?/d2 + c2 r ^a2 "" ( ai/a2^ s i
The optimal price of the second product provides for the
recovery of not only its marginal processing cost "but also
the entire capacity cost. In addition, the optimal price is
reduced for a share of the contribution on unprocessed pro-
duction of the first product. If the marginal cost of the
second product (c 2 + b/a2 - a-,s-./ap) is positive, as is
likely, then the product should be marketed at demand
elasticity greater than unity.
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Implementation of th e Opt imal Policy
The preceding sections examined the profit-maximizing
price policy with special attention to the case in which
some joint production is sold at split-off. The present
section considers a graphical analysis of these results
as v/ell as results obtained by Manes and Smith and by
Colberg under somewhat more restrictive assumptions.
In general, the purpose of this section is to show how
graphs may be used to obtain the profit-maximizing output
policy from fully specified demand and cost functions.
Three production situations are examined. The first,
which was examined by I'anes and S.-r.ith, requires all' joint
production to receive separate processing and assumes that
excess production receives costless disposition* The
second, which was examined by Colberg, also assumes that
excess production does not affect profit,, but does not
require that such production receive separate processing.
The third situation accords with the model presented earlier
in this paper and permits sales at split-off in a perfectly
competitive market. Thus the third case comes closest to
representing the joint cost problem as it is usually
represented in cost accounting texts.
The optimal policy under the MS model may be demonstrated
by reference to Figure 2. Since the two products arise in
fixed proportions, both revenue and cost may be written as

Pig. 2"b
K* '
FIGURE 2
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functions of K. Profit maximization requires that batch
capacity, K, be set such that the appropriate marginal
revenue equals total marginal cost. In Figure 2, total
marginal revenue, FTRm> is the vertical summation of the
marginal revenue lines of the separate products, MR-, and
MR«. Since the MS model requires that all joint production
receive separate processing, MC«, is a-, c, + a^Cp + h. All
that needs be done io to determine the output levels, k^,
kp, and km , at which marginal cost intersects the three
marginal revenue lines. The optimal batch size, X*, is
then simply the largest k-value. If k™ is the largest
k-value, as it is in Figure 2a, then the entire production
of both joint products is marketed at prices equal to the
separate demand (or average revenue) functions at km.
On the other hand, if k
?
is the largest k-value, as in
Figure 2b, then the entire production of the second product
is marketed at a price equal to average revenue at k? , but
only part of the first product's production will be marketed
and that at the price corresponding to MR., of zero. The
unmarketed production of the first product receives costless
disposition. It is important to notice that the optimal
policy was achieved without reference to any assignment
of cost.

17
Colberg's model is like the MS model in that excess
production of a joint product receives eostlesr disposition,
but it is unlike the IIS model in that such production does
not receive separate processing. Again, three k-values are
determined by reference to marginal cost as follows:
(i) k-, is n by the intersection of MR,
and MC, = su o. + b;
J, 1 X
(ii) k« is given by the intersection of If«
and MCp = &pCp + b;
(iii) k,T is given by the intersection of MRm
and MC«, - a1 c, + &pCp + b.
As demonstrated in Figure 3, the optimal batch size, K*,
is given by the largest k-value. If km is the largest
k-value, as in Figure 3a, then the entire production of
both joint products in marketed at prices equal to the
average revenue functions at km . On the other hand, if
kp is the largest k-value, as in Figure 3b, then the
entire production of the secord product is marketed after
separate processing at a price equal to average revenue
at kp. But only part of the first product's production will
be marketed and that at the price corresponding to the equality
of MR, and a, c-;
.

Fig e 3a Fig. 3b
UR2 3
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Under the model considered by this paper, the firm
has the option of selling a joint product in a perfectly
competitive market before it incurs the separate processing
cost. Under this model, three k-values again lead to an
identification of the optimal batch size, The three k-values
are calculated ollov/s:
(i) k-. is given by the intersection of MR-,
and MC-, = a-,c-, - a2 s 2 + *>;
(ii) k« is given by the intersection of T4Rp
and MC
2 =
a
2
c 2 " alsl + D '
(iii) k™ is given by the intersection of MRm
and MCm = (c, - s^a-^ + (c 2 - s 2^ a2 + **•
Again, the largest k-value is the optimal batch capacity.
If km = K*, then the entire production of the two joint
products is sold after separate processing (Case II )„
On the other hand, if kp is the largest k-value, as in
Figure 3b, then the entire production of the second product
is sold after separate processing* But only part of the
first product's production will be marketed after separate
processing; the remainder will be sold at split-off. In
other words? an instance of Case I is indicated when either
k, or k« exceeds km .
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In summary, the optimal batch size under each model
is the largest of three k-values—k, , kp, and k«. k.. is
the optimal sales level for the first product when profit
maximization requires sale or disposition of some of the
second product at split-off* Similarly, kp is the optimal
sales level for the second product when profit maximization
requires sale or disposition of some of the first product
at split-off, nally, km is optimal sales level for
both products when profit maximization requires that the
entire production of both products be sold after separate
processing. While the three k-values have essentially the
same interpretation under all three models, different
marginal costs enter their determination in each model.
But every marginal cost includes the marginal joint pro-
cessing cost, b, which demonstrates that implementation
of the optimal policy does not require an allocation of
such cost under any of the models considered,
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Accounting for Bv-Products
mi., , .1 - - i ii n-- i -" ii . ii
Manes and Smith argue that their analysis justifies
the traditional approach to "by-product cost accounting
whenever profit maximization results in withholding some
joint production from the market. The}' interpret the
traditional approach "to allocate no input cost to the
by-product and to indicate net revenue of the by-product
either as a reduction in the cost of goods sold of the major
17product or as supplemental income." The nature of the
justification requires close scrutiny. Consider the imple-
mentation of the optimal policy under the Manes and Smith model,
Suppose that k? is the maximum k-value; then part of the
first product's output is withheld from the market. If
the first product is treated as a by-product, it receives
no cost; the entire input cost is assigned to the second
product which is called the main or major product. But
how does this assignment of cost assist in fixing the
optimal prices? He optimal price of the second product
is its average revenue at kp* which is calculated without
reference to cost* The optimal price of the first product
is its average revenue at the sales volume that brings
marginal revenue to zero where zero is the marginal cost
of expanding sales of the first product. In other words,
the marginal cost of the by-product is required in order
to fix the optimal price and sales volume of the by-product.
While the assignment of cost is not useful in fixing the
optimal price of the main product, it is useful in fixing
the optimal price of the by-product.
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A similar argument can be made for the other models
considered in the preceding section, but not without
recommending a modi: accounting procedure
for by-products. The p: dified to assign
each unit of t parately | d by-product its marginal
cost
—
(c- ) under the Colberg mod nd (c-, + s-,) under the
third model.
Returning to the Manes and Smith model, there is a
second './ay in which the marginal costs may be used in reaching
the optimal policy. Suppose that demand functions are less
than completely known; the firm knows only that some part of
the first product's production must be scrapped as in Figure 2b,
How then does the firm maximize profit? In this case, it is
useful to consider the separate marginal costs. The optimal
prices of the two products are given as follows:
p* = - D*/d*
p* = - D*/d| + c
2
+ (b + a
1
c
1
)/a
2
Since the positive demand components of the optimal prices
are unknown, a reasonable strategy is to adjust the prices
upward by small increments from the level of the marginal
costs—zero for the first product and c + (b + a,c, )/a„
for the second—until incremental revenue equals incremental
cost.
"! Q
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The firm would commence the process of adjustment by-
announcing a price for the second product equal to its
20
marginal cost* Having satisfied the resulting demand,
'
the firm would repeat the process with an incremented price.
The two observations of demand would enable the firm to
compute marginal revenue. If the computed marginal revenue
exceeds the marginal cost, the firm would announce a further
increment in price and continue the process until marginal
revenue fell to the level of marginal cost. Experimentation
with the price of the first product (some of which is
known to require costless disposition) would be conducted
simultaneously in a similar way except that marginal revenue
would be brought to zero.
The adjustment process for the other models considered
in the preceding section would be identical except that
the marginal costs would be calculated differently. In
summary, when the firm's only knowledge of demand is that
k-, or kp will be the maximum k-value, then the marginal
costs of the separate products may be useful in reaching
the optimal price-output polic such cases, there is
justification for an accounting procedure that assigns
;}oint products their marginal cost.

23
Summary
The purpose of this paper is to examine the information
requirements of the pricing decision for joint production in
fixed proportions, "./hen some production requires disposition
or sale at split-off, the marginal opportunity costs, v/hich
imply an allocation of the joint processing cost, are given
in terms of cost parameters alone. In that case, the joint
product whose entire production is separately processed is
allocated the entire joint cost. Such an allocation is
useful in that the decision maker is not lead to consider
the joint processing cost in setting the price and level of
separate processing; for the other product. The marginal cost
of this product takes different forms depending on the
conditions under v.r ' ich its sale at split-off and its separate
processing take place; consequently, the accountant must
exercise care in assigning the non-joint cost for purposes
of the pricing decision. Furthermore, id Ls known
to obtain but demand information is incomplete (such that
the optimal price-output policy is unknown), then the cost-
based portion of the 03 price be useful in exper-
imentation with price a utput in an effort to reach the
optimum.

FOOTNOTES
~^See, for example: Marshal R. Colberg, "Monopoly Prices
Under Joint Costs: Fixed Proportions," Journal of Political
Pconc-y, IL (1941), pp. 103-110; R. P. Panes and Vernon L.
Smith, : int Cost Theory and Accounting; Practice,"
The ;.cc 1:^1!:- ?.evie\; t PL (January, 1965), pp. 31-51; and
Roman L, . oil, Jr. , "Alloc g Joint Costs," American Pconomic
Review , LVIII (December* 1968)7 pp. 1342-1345.
2The analysis ' : that capacity, K, and production,
x-} and Xp, are perfectly divisible,
3
"This assumption is less restrictive than those employed
"by Colberg (1941', Panes and Smith (1965)* Manes and
Smith assume that all production is either sold after separate
processing or scrapped without additional cost and that all
production is separately processed. Colberg 5 s most general
model does not require that all production be separately processed
but does require costless disposition at split-off. The model
considered here is somev.'hat more general in that all production
need not he separately processed and in that unprocer ed production
may generate a nonzero contribution at split-off. All three
models, hov;ever, are single-period analyses under which production
for inventory is precluded: all production is marketed or scrap-
ped v/ithin the production period.
This characterizes both the Manes and Smith model and
the models considered by Colberg,
c
Revenue from separately processed production of the ith
joint product, R>, may be written in two ways. In general,
revenue is the product of price and quantity sold, but that
product may be given either as a function of price, p., or
as a function of quantity sold, v., that is,
Ri = V?i
= Pi*V pP
iu i' yL
where y. = D«(p.-)» which is the demand function, and o,. = Z.(y. ),
which is the inverse demand function. If the inverce exists,
then the two formulations of revenue are equivalent, and an
optimal price is equivalent to an optimal sales level. The
equations above assume that the demands for the two products
are independent of one a*. other; hence, the demand for each
product is a function of its price alone and not the price of
the other product. Similarly, the price of each product is a
function of its sales alone and not the sales of the other orodui

g
If the solution to the maximization problem were sought
in terms of outputs rather than prices, then the cost function
would have the following form:
r
n
A production process may generate a joint product (e.g.,
scrap) t is not susceptible of further processing. If
such production is sold in a perfectly competitive market,
then its contribution per unit of capacity merely reduces the
unit capacity cost, b. This accords with the recommended
procedure of crediting the net realisable value of scrap to
the cost of joint production. ; type of joint product is
distinguished from unprocessed joint production that is
susceptible of further processing.
°If all production is sold in perfectly competitive
markets, then the problem reduces to a linear programming
problem in which nrices are known constants. A thorough
treatment of problems of this type is given by Ronald V„
Hartley, "Decision Making When Joint Products Are Involved,"
The Accounting Review
,
X1VT (October, 1971), 746-755.
^The necessary conditions for a saddle-point solution
are also sufficient provided that profit is a concave function
of the prices, disposal quantities and capacity. Profit is
concave if and only if D-. and D? are concave when p, - c^ ^
and p~ - c~ >. 0, which in turn is true if and only if the
*d cl 2 2
second derivative of demands with respect to price, cL and d^t
are zero or negative. In short e are willing to assume
that the second derivative c h demand functions will not
assume positive values, then the conditions above are both
necessary and sufficient for p. when p. - c.
; ^0 e Since the
second derivative of a linear demand function is zero, the
requirement is fulfilled for our example. See G. Hadley,
Nonlinear and Dynamic Programming (Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-V/esley Publishing Company, Inc., 1964).
See C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), pp. 100-102.

If part of. one product's production is sold at the
split-off point, then the entire production of the other
product will almost always be marketed after separate
processing. This result assumes that K, the batch capacity,
is sufficiently adjustable to be set at the optimal level.
If uj is positive, then ^, = s~„ Prom (20), jjL = b/a^ - (a,/a2 )s.,
provided k is positive. Substituting in (17), we have the
requirement that
u| (sg - b/a2 + ais 2'/a2^ ~ °
Since the term i- heses rare iuals zero, u£
nearly always equals zero, ' uj equals zero, then the
entire production of the second product is sold after separate
processing.
12
A third case might be identified in which the entire
production is sold at split-off. In this case, no price
policy is necessary because the markets for production at
split-off are perfectly competitive.
13V/eil (1968), pp. 1342-1343.
14Ibid
., p. 1343.
15Manes and Smith (1965), p. 33.
^-^The difference in conclusions is a consequence of their
assumption that marginal cost of units scrapped at split-off
equals the marginal cost of units sold after separate processing
or, equivalently, that excess production receives costless
disposition after incurring the separate processing cost. This
assumption enables them to write the optimal price in terms of
demand parameters alone; from this and the assumed positive
price, it follows that demand elasticit ist be unity. This
result can be demonstrated under the present model* If we
let s^ = - c-j^ when u? > 0, then ^ = - c-. and the right-hand
side of equation (23) is zero. Since price is positive, this
means that N* must equal unity. Moreover, from" equation (22)»
price is given by the demand component alone.

17Manes and Smith (1965), p. 33.
1 ftx It is important to notice that Case I does not
coincide v/ith the by-product care as usually defined.
Cost accounting texts define a by-product as a joint
product ,rhose importance or value is small relative
to other joint products from the same process. Although
the definition is not I is clear that it may
be interpr to include instances of Case II and to
exclude instances of Care I. Moreover, the definition
is not restrictec to fi: ropo: s. Consequently,
when we s~y that the a is of Case I justifies by-
product accounting we refer only to the coincidence of
the definition Case I,
1 9
In the absence of complete specification of demand
functions, the separate marginal costs are known when either
k, or k« is known to be the largest k-value 9 But the
marginal costs of the separate products are not known when
k^ is expected to be the largest k-value unless the demand
functions are also known. Consequently, if demand functions
are unknown, except to the extent that L is expected to be
the largest k-value, separate marginal costs cannot be used
to pursue the optimal policy,
20 Careful judgment must be exercised in this process
of adjustment. If, for example, the firm is unable to
satisfy demand in any period, demand in the following period
may be affected and some adjustment would be in order.
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